The draft for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Directive in the European Union includes the suggestion for an apportionment formula which allocates taxable group profits to group member corporations. These allocated profits shall then be taxed in the respective Member
Introduction
The European Commission has published in March 2011 a proposal for a Council Directive on a (optional) Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). 1 The basic outline of the proposed EU-wide cross-border corporate tax system contains a consolidated group taxation using formulary apportionment to allocate the consolidated taxable group income among the involved group entities. In a first step each group member separately calculates its taxable income based on the provisions of the CCCTB. The separate profits or losses of every group member will then be consolidated to calculate the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base of the group. In a third and last step, this tax base will be allocated to the group entities. Every group member will then be taxed separately by its situs state based on the apportioned income at the situs state's statutory corporate income tax rate. In other words: the taxable profit is determined according to a common set of rules, the tax rates that are applied to the apportioned tax base vary by state. Several benefits are expected from such a group tax system, including among other reduction of compliance costs, cross border loss offset, elimination of interim profits and the irrelevance of transfer pricing (EU Commission 2011). Sceptics doubt in particular the reduction of compliance costs and expect unpredictable company reactions, which might lead to factor shifting instead of profit shifting (Weiner 1994; Klassen and Shackelford 1998; Mintz and Smart 2004; Bettendorf et al. 2010 ).
The need to allocate the CCCTB to the EU Member States in which the group members are seated, asks for the application of an algebraic formula. The factors included in the apportionment formula as suggested by the EU Commission include Sales (S), Assets (A) and Labour, based on the assumption that these three factors are causal to the generation of profits. At the current state of discussion, each factor should be weighed equally, notwithstanding future political negotiations. The factor Sales represents the demand side of the profit generating process while the factors Labour and Assets represent the supply side. These factors are already in use in some federally structured jurisdictions (Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the United States) that have a formulary system to allocate the federal tax base (most importantly the US state corporate income tax and the Canadian provincial income tax) to states, provinces and municipalities. However, deviating from the practice in North America (which seemed to have served as a role model to a great extent), the employment apportionment factor does not exclusively rely on Payroll Costs (P), but also takes into account the Number of Employees (NE) in the respective Member State. According to the suggested formula, subject to further political debate, the tax base of a particular group 3 member ( ), which is a share in the consolidated group tax base (CTB), would be calculated as follows: * *
According to the CCCTB Working Group (WG-CCCTB), the sharing mechanism should be easy to apply for corporations and tax authorities and difficult to manipulate for taxpayers. It should lead to a fair and equitable distribution of corporate group income to the EU Member States and
should not trigger undesirable effects of tax competition.
The use of multiple apportionment factors is seen as being superior to using just one apportionment key, as multiple apportionment keys might be able to capture the profit-generating factors better and thus diminishing volatility and the randomness of the apportionment procedure's outcome (WG-CCCTB 2007a) . Multiple factors shall make artificial manipulations more difficult and thus economic distortions less likely to occur (LePan 1984) . Further, multiple factors shall enhance a stable apportionment of taxable income over time (Martens-Weiner 2006) .
Most importantly the Proposal applies one uniform apportionment scheme and disallows autonomous unilateral factor weightings -contrary to the setting of the U.S. state corporate income tax system. According to Martens-Weiner (2006) , the uniformity of the apportionment scheme is of much greater importance than its actual design. Evidence from formulary apportionment approaches in North America evidently shows that Canada is better off with a uniform apportionment scheme than the U.S. states with their differing factor weightings (Weninger 2008 ).
Contrary to the theory of providing as much uniformity as possible in the formula, the current suggestion of the Commission leaves some leeway of discretion to the Member States with regard to the factor Number of Employees (NE) Using a game-theoretic approach, the paper shows the effects of Member States applying different definitions of 'Employee'. In a setting where tax rates differ among Member States
MNC´s react to state´s definitions by shifting workforce (or by opting out of the CCCTB), and States suffer or benefit from MNC´s relocations. To our knowledge, such analysis of the apportionment formula with a specific focus on the novel element of the 'Number of Employees', has not been carried out before. The result of our research may be helpful to European policy makers for the further development of the CCCTB and the respective formula apportionment.
The paper proceeds as follows: after providing a quick overview of related literature, especially tax literature using game theoretic approaches in section 2 and giving further institutional and economic information about the employment factor in the apportionment formula (section 3) we first present a simple apportionment game (section 4.1), which serves as the basis for more complex forms of the game (section 4.2). Section 5 discusses the results and possible further extensions of the game and concludes. (Rixen 2005) . When additional economic differences besides tax rate differences are considered, it is argued that both small and big countries have conflicting interests with regard to tax competition (Dehejia and Genschel 1999) . As declining tax rates are connected with large welfare losses for big countries, bigger countries are more interested in international coordination in order to prevent a race to the bottom of tax rates. Small countries, contrarily, being able "to over-compensate the potential welfare loss of lower taxes with the influx of additional tax base from other countries" would rather welcome tax competition (Rixen 2011 at p 202) . Due to this conflict of interests, international tax competition is regarded by some as being better modelled as an asymmetric PD-game. Dagan (2000) uses the Game Theory framework to analyse methods to eliminate international double taxation. Using a PD-game, she determines whether a country, striving to maximize national welfare would be better off eliminating international double taxation unilaterally or bilaterally by concluding a tax treaty. Dagan concludes that in some constellations unilateral measures against international double taxation could lead to optimal economic results that cannot be reached with tax treaties. Rixen (2008) also models the strategic interactions of two countries in relieving double taxation and preventing tax avoidance using different types of games (PD-Game, Assurance Game). He finds that for the residence country unilaterally providing relief for double taxation is welfare-maximizing. There are further examples where other games are used to analyse issues of international taxation. Dehejia and Genschel (1999) , for instance, model tax competition as a "battle of the sexes" game. In their view, it is not so much defection that prevents international tax cooperation but rather distributional issues that make cooperation "controversial". Which game is in the end the most suitable depends on the precise issue to be analysed and on the assumptions made (Rixen 2008) . Ohlin (2011) 
Related Literature

The Employment Apportionment Factor
In the apportionment formula, the factor Employment is split into two equally weighted 
The Apportionment Game
Playing the Game simple
The implementation of CCCTB can be viewed as a game where governments of (at maximum) 28 EU Member States are players. In modelling the decision making process it suffices to focus on a game of two Member States as actors, for simplicity reasons. The game is finite in the sense that it ends once the CCCTB directive is implemented in domestic law. It is assumed that the Member States play simultaneously. Such, we consider the time-span after the promulgation date of the directive and before the implementation date of the domestic act transposing the directive into national law. During this time Member States decide independently and simultaneously which definition of 'Employee' is deemed relevant. We do not include subsequent adaptions of the respective definitions which may result from reactions to other Member States´ decisions. We assume complete information and common knowledge among players.
In a simple view of the game, where tax rate differences as well as general economic differences of the Member States are disregarded, the pay-off ( ) for one Member State is equal to the tax revenues expressed as allocated tax base ( ) multiplied by the domestic corporate income tax rate ( ).
Governments will try to maximize their pay-offs. This individual rationality (which could also be described as state-level egoism Under the CCCTB apportionment formula 1/3 of the taxable income is allocated by the employment factor, the rest is allocated by the other apportionment factors (Sales and Assets). To focus on the employment factor the other factors are assumed to be identical among the involved 9
Member States and held constant to allocate the rest of the taxable income equally to the Member States A and B.
For simplicity reasons the players (i.e. the Member States) have only two alternative 'Employee' definitions: broad (including all atypical employment relations) and narrow (excluding all atypical employment relations). Playing broad while the other Member State plays narrow will allocate the share of taxable income that is sensitive to the employment factor definition wholly to the broad player and not to the narrow player. If both players choose the same strategy the taxable income is allocated equally to both Member States.
Assuming constant Sales and Assets factors among the players allows focussing all consideration on that third of the tax base which is allocated on the basis of labour ( ) and the part of payoff resulting therefrom ( ). Further assuming an equal relation of the (broadly defined)
Employee factor in both Member States, means that they share equally the tax revenue as it relates to the employment factor, and assuming identical volumes of atypical employment schemes (a) in both Member States. The broad definition therefore takes the value of 1; the narrow definition takes the value of (1-a The interactions between two Member States adopting these strategies are presented in The rather simple static one-shot game presented in Figures 1 and 2 above is based on the assumptions that both Member States are equally alike and the game also does not include any reactions of the involved corporate group and any repercussions on the Member States' tax revenues that may arise from corporate decisions such as relocations of functions, assets and employees. In the following section these elements will be discussed and introduced to the game. . Even if these statutory tax rates do not reflect the effective tax burden of corporations, they
are an indicator and a policy measure easy to compare for corporate decision makers. Therefore statutory tax rates have an important signaling effect of how "business friendly" a domestic tax system might be and can be regarded as one major location factor. In their perpetual attempts to attract foreign direct investments and business relocations, EU Member States compete with each other not only on the level of statutory tax rates but also and more covert on the level of income determination rules such as depreciation allowances or loss carry forwards. Since the CCCTB draft does explicitly not include a proposal for a harmonized tax rate, the CCCTB regime will not put an end to tax competition among EU Member States, but will rather restrict it to competition on statutory tax rates.
For the further development of our game we assume constant tax rate differentials, with tax rates as exogenously determined. We will not include tax rate convergence, more precisely: a race to the bottom, for a number of reasons. The assumption of a lowering of tax rates, either exclusively for corporations which are subject to the CCCTB, or for all corporations / business entities seems not plausible. In the first case (specific tax rates for CCCTB-corporations) the principle of equality provided for by EU-Treaty and by national constitutional law might be infringed. The freedom of establishment (Art 49 et seq TFEU) in general prohibits taxing EU-wide cross-border transactions at a higher rate than purely domestic transactions. Vice versa, many national constitutions prohibit taxing purely domestic transactions at a higher rate than cross-border transactions (e.g. Art 3 German Constitution "Grundgesetz", Art 7 Austrian Constitution "Bundesverfassungsgesetz", Art 1 French Constitution "Constitution Française du 4 Octobre 1958", Art. 1 Spanish Constitution Constitución Española, etc). These two constitutional barriers may prohibit Member States from introducing special tax rates for corporations subject to the CCCTB-14 regime. In the second case (general lowering of tax rates, for all corporations / entities) dramatic consequences on Member States' tax revenues are possible. Further, the existing tax rate differences between US states, Canadian provinces, German municipalities and Swiss cantons, where formulary apportionment is used to allocate tax bases for income tax or trade tax purposes, show that such convergence of tax rates is highly unlikely, even in the absence of multilevel constitutional barriers.
For these reasons we assume tax rates as exogenously fixed, i.e. we assume tax rate differences between EU Member States will persist and, given the lack of competition via tax base, grow in relevance. As a consequence, the game presented above, will benefit from expanding by tax rate differences.
When discussing the real effects of the CCCTB formulary apportionment, it proves useful to refer to research on apportionment formulas used by a number of federalist jurisdictions (Canada, Germany, Switzerland, U.S.) for allocating taxable income between cantons, municipalities, provinces or states. Even though apportionment factors serve as apportionment keys for taxable income and only the latter is taxed, McLure (1977) proves that formulary apportionment has the same economic effects as a separate and additional excise tax on the factors included in the apportionment formula.
The corporate income tax thus changes into a sales tax, an assets tax and, most relevant for this evaluation, an employment tax. McLure demonstrates these economic effects against the background of the U.S. sharing mechanism that is used to allocate taxable corporate income among U.S. states for the purposes of state corporate income taxation under which the states are free to design their apportionment schemes, leading to non-uniform apportionment formulas. McLure´s findings however also hold true in a uniform sharing mechanism among the participating jurisdictions, as long as tax rates differ (Edmiston 2002; McIntyre 2002) , since a formulary apportionment system is tax-neutral only if there are no tax rate differences among the participating jurisdictions (Gordon and Wilson 1986; Giannini 2002; Riedel 2010) . As a consequence, applying the employment apportionment factor leads to an increase in the marginal effective wage rate (Weiner 1994) , makes labour more expensive and is thus likely to reduce the wage level in a jurisdiction (Wellisch 2004; Oestreicher 2002) . The reason for that is that the total costs of employment equal the direct compensation payments and the marginal apportionment tax (Weiner 1994 ). In addition, formulary apportionment could distort consumer choices between high-labour-intense and lowlabour-intense products (McLure 1986) . Edmiston (1998) thus concludes that with regards to the U.S.
state corporate income tax, an aggressive reduction of the weight assigned to input factors is perceived to effectively reduce unemployment and/or increase workforce immigration. On the contrary, an increase of the weight assigned to the employment factor could escalate unemployment and might lead to emigration and business relocations out of that jurisdiction.
There is also some empirical evidence that including payroll cost in the apportionment scheme has a significant impact on the employment level. Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) present empirical evidence that a reduction of the weight assigned to the labour factor in the U.S. apportionment formula from 1/3 to 1/4 in State A resulted in an increase of employed workforce by 1.1% in State A and a decrease of employed workforce in the other States. Anand and Sansing (2000) present similar findings as they show empirically that an increase in the relative weight assigned to the sales factor and a corresponding decrease in the weighting of the assets and labour factors in State A resulted in an increase of production volume in that State at the cost of decreasing production activity in State B.
In Europe, the German Trade Tax system applies a single factor apportionment formula using the amount of wages paid to allocate taxable income among municipalities. Buettner, Riedel and Runkel (2011) as well as Thomsen, Ullmann and Watrin (2013) 
present empirical results from
Germany showing that tax rate differences lead to changes in the organisational structure of the business and to relocations of assets and workforce from high-tax cities to low-taxing municipalities.
Summing up, assigning a higher weight to the input factors can produce negative effects on the jurisdiction's economy -for the CCCTB apportionment mechanism this applies to a broad definition of the employment factor. Broadening the definition makes employment more expensive, and corporations will arguably react to that by decreasing the employed workforce or by decreasing the wage level in the respective Member State resulting in an actual reduction of the apportionment factor's volume and negative ancillary effects such as a reduction in wage taxes, private consumption, VAT revenues or an increase of paid-out unemployment benefits.
Modeling the pay-off structure a) Tax rate differentials and definition differences
Introducing different magnitudes of definition effects and different tax rates in both Member States of the game changes the pay-off structure, links the individual pay-offs to the difference in the magnitudes and opens up some tax minimizing possibilities for the corporate group.
Let Member State A be a low-tax country and Member State B a high-tax country ( ). The corporate groups would therefore prefer the outcome broad/narrow (i.e. a broad 'Employee' definition in the low-tax country and a narrow definition in the high-tax country, to benefit most of the tax rate differential, irrespective of the share of atypical employment in either state) over any other combinations of strategies.
The numerical example from the simple game in section 4.1 could again be used to illustrate the discussed effects of differing definitions of the employment factor and of tax rate differences. Member State A has the lower tax rate of 15% and Member State B is the high-tax country ( 25%). As before, the allocable tax base attributable to the employment factor ( ) amounts to 100. The share of the allocable tax base that is sensitive to the employment factor definition differs between the two countries. Referring to the aforementioned EU Commission
Report "Social protection rights of economically dependent self-employed workers" we use the minimum share for such workers for Member State A (a 8%) and the highest share for Member State B (b 36%). The other apportionment factors allocate the remaining two thirds of the taxable income equally among the Member States A and B. The pay-offs can be calculated using formulae (5a-h) as follows: These results shall now be extended by corporate reactions which result from the corporate group finding itself in a situation where the Member States each opt for a broad definition of the employment factor. In this case, as illustrated, the effective group tax rate is higher than it would be in a situation where the high-tax country opts for a narrow definition. The group supposedly reacts by relocating employment from the high-tax country to the low-tax country.
The aforementioned empirical findings from the U.S. and Germany suggest that the employment apportionment factor has a major influence on un/employment. Thus changes in the factor could cause business migrations from one country to the other (i.e. reduction of jobs in hightax countries and creation of additional jobs in low-tax countries). Individually rational corporate managers will try to maximize the after-tax profit of the corporate group. They will thus tend to locate workforce, functions, assets and business premises in jurisdictions where the apportionment factors and especially the employment factor positively influence the after-tax profit. These location decisions also influence the volume of the other apportionment factors.
In order to maximize after tax profit the corporate group could, among other, try to minimize the tax burden of the group ( ).
arg min ∑ *
The overall tax burden however depends on the apportionment outcome of the CCCTBformula and the applicable tax rates as depicted in expression (7).
The tax burden can be reduced by manipulating the outcome of the apportionment procedure by influencing the volume and the location of the apportionment factors. Ceteris paribus and focusing again on the employment factor a change in the allocation of workforce and personnel expenses among the various group entities leads directly to a change in the group's overall tax burden and in the group's after-tax profit ( denotes the share in the total group tax burden which is allocated by the employment factor): * ∑ * *
Rearranging expression (8) leads to expression (9) that shows on the one hand that formulary apportionment changes the corporate income tax to an excise taxation of the apportionment factors and on the other hand it shows the direct relation between the location decision of the employment factor (payroll cost and number of employees) and the overall tax burden of the CCCTB group.
By using this direct linkage between the location of the employment factor and the tax burden the corporate group can minimize through shifting the employment factor to relatively low-tax Member States. This can be done by either increasing wages in low-tax Member States (and if possible correspondingly decreasing wages in high-tax Member States) or by moving employment 22 from high-tax to low-tax Member States. As increasing wages in the low-tax country (at least without correspondingly decreasing wages in high-tax jurisdictions) undermines the aim of maximizing the group's after tax profit the MNC will tend to shift employment (jobs) from high to low-tax jurisdictions. 7 The specifics of the applicable 'Employee' definition will influence the effectiveness of such location decisions of corporate groups.
These foreseeable reactions, that corporate groups will adapt the volume of workforce in one country contingent on the country's 'Employee' definition and tax rate, change the pay-off structure of the game. The pay-offs after relocation ( ′ ) are still a combination of tax revenues ( ) that are calculated based on the allocated share of the tax base ( ) multiplied by the domestic corporate income tax rate ( ). The movements of workforce ( ) from one Member State to the other are contingent on the different definitions of 'Employee' applied by the Member States, the volume of atypical employment relations and the respective tax rates. 8 As before, we assume that the group´s structure of typical vs. atypical employment corresponds to the country´s average structure.
Since corporate groups seek to minimize their effective tax rates by shifting the employment factor into low-tax countries their ultimate benchmark for an effective tax rate would be the minimum domestic tax rate in the group. In this extreme (and unrealistic) case, the corporate group would shift all employees (and all activities) to the Member State with the lowest tax rate, but stay within the CCCTB area.
The target effective group tax rate can be defined as , i.e. . It can be achieved through factor shifting from the high-tax to the low-tax country. The potential relocations of the employment factor ( ) is a function of , the tax rates of the involved countries ( ; ) and of the domestic potentials for definition gains (a; b).
/ incentivizes employment factor immigration to the low-tax country and thus maximizes the individual pay-off of the low-tax Member State A.
For both Member States therefore playing narrow is the dominant strategy and narrow/narrow is the new equilibrium. This equilibrium is a Nash-Equilibrium in pure strategies and it is Pareto-optimal. It does not depend on the relation between a and b.
12
Discussion and Conclusion
The draft CCCTB directive suggests defining a common consolidated corporate tax base, which is then allocated by an apportionment formula to the respective group entities, subject to the corporate tax rate in the respective Member States. The draft directive allows the Member States to autonomously define the term 'Employee' which is essential to the employment apportionment factor. Individually rational Member States, seeking maximum pay-offs, will use this margin of discretion to increase the volume of the employment factor and thus to maximize the apportioned share of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base. The decision making whether to define the term 'Employee' rather broad so that it captures all different types of work relationships or narrow so that atypical employment relations are not included into the apportionment factor is modelled in this paper as a competitive game with two players.
In absence of tax rate differences and differences in the volume of atypical work relationships the interaction of both individually rational strategies of using a broad definition of 'Employee' (broad/broad) results in a Pareto-optimal Nash-equilibrium in which both Member States get an equal share of taxable income allocated.
If tax rate differences and different volumes of atypical work relationships that could either be included in or disregarded from the employment factor are introduced to the game the analysis shows that the broad/broad equilibrium is not the first-best outcome for corporate groups.
The strategy interaction of broad/narrow where the low-tax country applies a broad and the high-tax country uses a narrow definition yields the lowest tax burden for a corporate group and thus the most preferable outcome for corporate groups.
12 Also when using the internally developed target benchmark tax rate ( , / ) the strategies narrow remain dominant and the equilibrium narrow/narrow still applies though the order of the amount of relocation and the order of the size of the ancillary effects changes depending on the relation between a and b with
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Empirical evidence shows that corporate groups will use factor shifting to minimize the overall tax burden. The foreseeable reaction of corporate groups is to relocate the employment factor from the high-tax country to the low-tax country. Such, they replicate the tax burden in the most preferable interaction of Member States' 'Employee' definitions (broad/narrow) or influence the factor allocation to achieve an externally defined target effective group tax rate irrespective of the actual definitions applied by the involved Member States.
The magnitude of the factor shifting necessary for the corporate group to circumvent any less preferable definition interactions of the Member States depends on the actual definition interaction and on the volume of atypical employment relations that could either be included in or disregarded from the 'Employee' definition. The migration of the employment factor produces on the one hand relocation cost for the corporate group but on the other hand also economic gains and losses for the involved Member States' economies. These ancillary economic effects are considered in modelling the pay-offs. The analysis shows that a high-tax Member State could minimize the volume of employment factor emigration by choosing a narrow 'Employee' definition. A low-tax
Member State however could maximize the employment factor immigration by also choosing a narrow 'Employee' definition. Thus for both involved Member States narrow is the dominant strategy when reactions of corporate groups are considered in the model. The two dominant strategies lead to a Pareto-optimal Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies narrow/narrow.
The factor shifting with all its direct tax effects and its indirect ancillary economic effects could be prevented or mitigated if the CCCTB is introduced optionally. The optionality of the CCCTBregime is under discussion among Member States, however the European Parliament voted for a compulsory introduction of CCCTB in April 2014 (see Press Release Nr 20120418IPR43390 13 ). An optional CCCTB would allow corporate groups to decide on their applicable tax regime i.e. being taxed according to the CCCTB-Directive and its domestic transformations or being taxed traditionally according to up to 28 domestic corporate income tax laws. The corporate group could therefore optout of the CCCTB-regime if its individual tax rate benchmark is not achievable within the CCCTBregime through factor shifting. Opting-out of the CCCTB-regime however produces additional direct and indirect cost for the corporate group (transitional cost in the event of opting-out, subsequent cost including but not limited to compliance cost of up to 28 national tax regimes involving different tax accounting regimes, transfer pricing regulations, cross-border loss offset, etc) and leaves the corporate group with a non-trivial estimation of benefits and drawbacks of opting-out. If the 13 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20120418IPR43390/20120418IPR43390_en.pdf 30 traditional system is more beneficial to the corporate group the CCCTB-regime will not be applied.
Corporate relocations will still be used to capitalize tax rate differences however these corporate location decisions will not be influenced directly by the CCCTB-rules and the discussed 'Employee' definitions of the Member States.
The games in section 4 involve only two actors. The CCCTB employment factor game however would be played among actors (with currently 28 14 ). The extension of the two-player game to an -actor situation is straightforward and can be drawn from theories well-developed in existing literature (Snidal 1985; Ward 1996; Lipson 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985) ; it corresponds to the standard case of externalities where each State imposes costs or benefits on others (in-)dependent of their own behavior (Ward 1996) . In terms of ordinal preferences, every Member
State is in the same symmetric relation to every other Member State. This extension can be depicted in terms of an -dimensional "cube" where each dimension represents one of the Member State's policy alternatives and the outcome is represented by the point in the "cube" (and corresponding pay-offs) determined by the choices of all Member States. As all Member States would have the dominant strategies narrow the extension to an -actor game would not change the Pareto-optimal Nash-equilibrium.
In a -actor game with corporate groups however the notions of high-tax and low-tax
countries cannot be applied consistently anymore. Thus it is hardly possible to consistently identify Member States that always have to play narrow to discourage employment factor emigration (hightax) or that always play narrow to incentivize employment factor immigration (low-tax). With the exception of the countries with the absolute highest (France) and lowest (Bulgaria and Cyprus) corporate income tax rates within the EU every Member State can be considered high-tax as well as low-tax, depending on the relating other Member State. A domestic narrow 'Employee' definition which is used to maximize employment factor immigration from one Member State with a higher statutory tax rate could at the same time be helpful in relation to a low-tax country to minimize employment factor emigration. These dichotomous characteristics of simultaneously being a (relatively) low-tax and a (relatively) high-tax country makes it virtually impossible to evaluate which EU Member State would ultimately gain or lose in the Employment Factor Game.
14 Or maybe less in case of Enhanced Cooperation, in which case a smaller group of Member Stated could introduce the CCCTB
